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Though in Title deeds land is bounded only 14,torally,
it is a fundamental principle of the law that the estate
and dominion of the owner of the land so bounded extends
from the sky to the lower depths or from heaven to hell if
we interpret literally the maxim, "Cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum et ad inferos." The following discussion
has to do with the law controlling property rights in ele-
ments beneath the surface, but as courts have never datended
t eir jurisdiction to the lowest depths the subject is na-
urally limited to the law as it applies to mankind in their
ddolings with subterranean property to a reasonable depth,
lealing those legally unexplored regions open to the farther
discussion of poets and theologians. But even within this
limited jurisdiction the courts have found a great deal to
say upon the subject of subterranean rights, and a thorough
discussion of the mass of decisions involving rights in
mine-als, ores, and mining 6perations, in petroleum oil,
in percolating waters, in natural gas, etc., is impossible
in the limits of an ordinary thesis.
I have therefore bMn compelled to limit the discussion
to somenarroip-rphase than rights in subterranean property
generally and have chosen that phase which has to do with
free elements, that is, those not fixed in any one place,
but mov*ig about under the surface in obedience to natural
laws. This at once excludes the mass of law on mines and
mining operations, except in so far as such operations in-
terfere wIth some other rights, as water rights. The ores
beneath the surface in absence of ag-'eement to the contrary
are admitted generally to belong to the ovner of the surface.
Rights in subterranean elements are often modified by con-
tract, and of course the rights qcqu!red in such a way depend
upon the nature of the contract in each particular case.
I have dealt only wi'th rights as they exist naturally and
independent of any contractual rights except those conferring
title to the surface, and as cases pertaining to petroleuzn
oil have invariably arisen out of oil leases, natural rights
not being involved to any great extent, they do not properly
come under discussion.
The majority of cases involving natural rights in free
elements have arisen in regard to rights in waters flowing
beneath the surfaceand the liability incurred b, owners of
3the surface interfering with their flow to adjoining premi-
ses. Cases relating to gas and electricity are also found
in the later volumes of the reports. The cases in regard
to subterranean waters will be first considered, they being
thus far of the most importance.
Rights in free elements beneath the surface, do not
depend to any great extent upon contract, but are natural
rights, gifts conferred by Nature fand consequently an inter-
ference with such rights would come under the law of torts.
It will therefore be wall in considering the cases upon
this subject to have in mind the general theory and appli-
cation of the law of torts, that we may have some principles
to guide us in their examination jand keep us from getting
lost in the tangle of judicial reasoning. A fundamental
principle of the law of torts is, that a person is liable
only for the natural and probable consequences of his acts.
That is, if a person does some act which results in damage
to another, which damage a person of ordinary prudence
would not reasonably expect to be the natural effect, of such
act then the person causing the damage is not responsible
and the injured party has no remedy. If however common
experience has shown that certain acts produce specified re-
sults under circumstances which should be known to the person
coranitting these acts, then such person is said to have
acted with noticejand will be held responsible for any damage
resulting unless he can justify doing such damage.
A simple case illustrating the application of these
principles is as follows:
X has a spring on his land, which is supplied by a
subterranean stream running under Y's land. Y having no
reason to believe that X's spring is supplied from his lan&i
digs a well which cuts off this supply and dries up X's
spring. The damage sustained by X is damnum absque injuria.
But if Y knew of the existence of the subterranean stream
that fed X's spring and dug his well thus ruining the spring,
the injury caused, according to our principle, would be action-
able if done without just cause. If Y escapes liability
it is because, in the opinion of the Court he has acted with
just cause, or in other words he is privileged, knowingly to
inflict the damage complained of.
The extent to which a person can claim such a privilege
is the difficult question in torts of this kind, and is large-
ly one of public policy. All laws should aim to accomplish
the greatest good to the greatest number, and in deciding a
question with regard to a privilege to knowingly inflict an
injury, we must compare the gain which would result from al-
lowing the act with the loss which it occasions. Briefly
stated these principles are: If defendant could not have
foreseen the damage he has caused he is not liable. If he
could have foreseen such damage, he is liable unless privil-
eged to knowingly inflict such damage. The question of
privilege is one of policy depending upon results.
Keeping these principles in mind, let us examine a few
of the leadin, cases and see where the courts in various
jurisdictions stand. One of the earliest and perhaps the case
most frequently referred to is that of Acton v. Blundell,
12 M & W 324. Here the plaintiff was the owner of a cotton-
mill and had sunk a well on his land for the use of such mill.
The defendants were mine owners and sunk shafts and dug pits
in operating their mine which was located about three-fourths
of a mile from plaintiff's well, whereby plaintiff's well
was made dry and thus destroyed. Judge Tindal in consider-
ing these facts says the question to be decided is, "Whether
the right to the enjoyment of an underground spring, or of a
well supplied by such underground spring, is goverened by
the same rule of law as that which applies to, and regulates
a water course flowing on the surface." After a brief dis-
cussion of the similarities and dissimilarities of surface
and subterranean streams and the principles applicable to
them the learned judge comes to the following conclusion:
"We think the present case for reasons above given, is not to
be governed by the law which applies to rivers and flowing
streams, but it rather falls within that principle, which gives
to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath his surface;
that the land immediately below is his property whether it
is solid rock or porous ground or venous gar'h, or part soil
and part water; that the person who owns the surface may
dig therein, and apply all that there is found to his own
purposes at his free will and pleasure; and if in the exer-
cise of such right he intercepts or drains off the water
collected from underground springs in his neighbor's well,
this inconvenience to his neighbor falls within the descrip-
tion of damnum absque injuria which cannot become the ground
of an action. " This extract is frequently referred to in
later cases and has undoubtedly exerted great influence in
shaping the course of the law on this point. While not
wishing to question the correctness of the decision in Act6n
v. Blumdell, it seems to me that this statement of the owners
dominion over the percolating waters in his soil is unneces-
sary to the decision of the caseand is open to criticism as
not being an accurate conclusion to be drawn f*om the facts
and reasoning in the case. Here the owners of the coal mine
could not be held to have foreseen that the natural and
probable consequence of their acts would be to dry up the
plaintiff's well and therefore should not have been held
liable. The learned judge in his opinion recognizes this
principle in an indirect way and lays much stress on it.
The flow of surface streams he says is "public and notorious",
each man knows what he receives and what he transmits to
the lower owners. "But in case of a well", he continues,
"sunk by a proprietor in his own land, the water which feeds
it from the neighboring soil does not flow openly in sight of
the neighboring proprietor, but through hidden veins of the
earth beneath its surface." This alone according to our
first principle would be sufficient to defeat the action, but
the judge also makes use of the argument that it is policy
to grant the defendants the privilege of inflicting this in-
jury. He says: "But if the man who sinks the well in his
own land can acquire by that act an absolute and indefeasible
right to the water that collects in it, he has the power of
preventing his neighbor from making any use of the spring
in his own soil which shall interfere with the enjoyment of
the well. He has power still further of debarring the
owner of the land in which the spring is first found or
through which it is transmitted, from draining his land for
the proper cultivation of the soil: and thus by an act
which is voluntary on his part, and which may be entirely
unsuspected by his neighbor he may impose on such neighbor
the necessity of bearing a heavy expense)if the latter has
erected machinery for the purposes of mining, and discovers
when too late that the appropriation of the water has al-
ready been made. Further the advantage on one side, and
the detriment to the pther may bear no proportion. The
well may be sunk to supply a cottage, whilst the owner of
the adjoining land may be prevented from winning metals
and minerals of inestimable value.A It is principally upon
these two arguments that the decision in this case rests,
and they fail to make it clear why water in a natural course
of transit under ground, should as such be more a subject of
individual property than water flowing above ground. It
does not necessarily follow that a person has an absolute
property in percolating waters, because he is not liable
for interrupting their flow, therh he would be liable for
interrupting the flow of surface waters in which he has only
a qualified right of property. The fallacy of this reason-
ing becomes more obvious by going back to the cause of the
non-liability for interfering with subterranean streams.
Stated from this stand point the argument would be as follows:
a riparian owner has only a qualified right in flowing sur-
facp water because he can see its flow, therefore since he
cannot percaivethefjow of subterranean Waters .he has an ab-
solute right of property in them. It seems to me that
it would be just as reasonable to make the absolute property
in minerals depend upon the want of knowledge as to their
existence. In a large number of cases however this state-
ment in Acton v. Blundell, that a different rule applys
with regard to surface and subterranean streams, and that
the owners of property in percolating waters is absolute is
accepted by learned judges without question.
In the leading case of Frazier v. Brown 12 Ohio St.294
plaintiff alleged that his spring was injured by defendant
digging a hole in his land. Defendant demurred to complaint
as not stating a cause of action and this demurrer was
sustained. Here the Court said: " In absence of express
contract, as between proprietors of adjoining land the law
recognizes no correlative rights in respect to underground
waters percolating, oozing or filtrating through the earth;
and this mainly from considerations of public policy: (1)
because the existence, origin, zd movement and course of
such waters, and the courses which govern their movements
are secret and concealedl (2) because any such recognition
of correlative rights would interfere, to the detriment of
the conmonwealth, with drainage and agriculture, mining,the
construction of highways, etc."
Here again we see the general principles laid down in
the beginning recognized as the true basis of the decision.
In Roath v. Driscoll 20 Conn. 533 the plaintiff's
well was injured by excavations made by defendant on his
own land. The Court refused to hold defendant liable, saying
"Water ccmbined with earth or passing through it by percola-
tion, or by filtration or chemical attraction has no distinc4
tive character of ownership from the earth itself." Acton v.
Blundell is cited with approval but here also the learned
judge makes use of the argtent that the damage could not be
foreseen. "Besides" says he, "no man is bound to know
that his neighbor's well is supplied by water percolating
his own soil." Again he says: "Nor can any light be ob-
tained from surface streams. Their progress over the surface
is seen and known and uniform. They are not in the secret
places of the earth and a part of it."
In Delhi v. Yeomans 50 Barb. 318 Judge Boardman states
the law as follows: "The law controlling the rights to sub-
terranean waters is very different from that affecting the
rights to surface streams. In the fonner case the water
belongs to the soil, is part of it, is owned and possessed
as the earth is, and may be used, removed and controlled to
the same extent by the owner." In this case two springs
of plaintiffs were injured by acts of defendant in digging
a ditch on his own land, and a correct decision was reached
from the application of the foregoing principle. This is
true however simply because this principle c,ould be deducted
from this case by the same line of reasoning by which it was
derived from the others.
In Chase v. Silverstone 62 Me. 175, defendant dug a
well on his own land thus drying up plaintiff's spring. In
deciding this case the Court cite *ith approval the principles
derived from Acton v Blundell and cases following it. So
in Chatfield v. Wilson 28 Vt. 49, the doctrine that a per-
son has an absolute right of property in percolating water
is recognized. In Goodale v. Tuttle 29 N. Y. Judge Denio
said: "We have lately decided that the principles which
apply to the abstructions of running streams do not govern
in the case of waters running under the soil."
Other cases might be cited to the same effect but theve
will be sufficient to show the position taken by many Courts.
Although a correct decision is reached in a majority of cases
I do not think the doctrine of abso-lute' oimership of the
waters beneath the surface is well founded in legal principles
and surely there is nothing in its practical operation that
so commends it to our approval as to lead to its adoption.
Such a doctrine is illogical and inconsistent. For if the
owner of the soil has an absolute property in the water,
the same as in the other elements his neighbor has no more
right to take away his water than he has to take away his
sand or ores. But the decisions already referred to dlear-
ly recognize the right of a person to make excavations in his
own land even if It does drain the water from his neighbors
soil. Thus a logical application of the doctrine would
bring about one of the very evils which by its adoption is
sought to be avoided. In most of the cases one of the
reasons given to sustain this doctrine is that, if a person
14
were held liable for interrupting a flow of subterranean
waters, he would lose all dominion over his land and could
not use it for ordinary purposes of cultivation or building
or mining, but the learned judges overlooked the fact that
these same operations were just as apt to cause a neighbor's
water, his property, to be taken away as it was to prevent
other water from flowing to the neighbo-'s premises. They
have jumped out of the f-ying pan only to land in the fire,
if they carry their doctrine to its logical conclusion.
An excellent case taking this view Is, Bassett v. Mining
Co., 43 N. H., 569. However, I do not wish to be understood
as saying that the law governing subterranean streams is
the same as that governing surface streams. What I do say
is this: that the same principles are applicable to both
subterranean and su-face streams, but that the application
of these principles to subterranean waters may lead to dif-
ferent results, than when applied to surface waters, in fact
we often have different rules arising from the application
of these principles to differen t surface streams. The
general rule with regard to surface streams is that each
riJparian owner has a right to use the water flowing through
his land as he may see fit, but he must. allow it to pass on
to his neighbor not materially altered in quality or quantity.
~15
This is said to be the general rule because the principles
of torts before mentioned when applied to a majority of the
cases produce such a result. The same principles applied
in a majority of cases relating to subterranean waters would
produce a different result, so that by applying the doctrine
that a different rule of law governs in subterranean and
surface waters a correct decision, as before stated would be
reached in most cases.
That the same principles apply to both surface and sub-
terranean waters and that the difference in results is due
to the fact that in one instance the damage can be foreseen
and in the other not, is also clearly shown in many cases
by dicta from the judges to the effect that, when the sub-
terranean waters flow in known and defined channels the
same law governs as is applicable to surface streams.As is.said
'4
by Lewis C. J. in Wheatley v. Bough, in limestone regions
streams of great volume and power pursue their subterranean
cources fo" great distances and then emerge from their caverns
furnishing power for machinery of every description, or sup-
plying towns and settlements with water for all the purposes
of life; and he expresses the opinion, that "to say that
these streams might be obstructed or diverted merely because
they run through subterranean channels, is to forget the
I0
rights and duties of man in relation to flowing water."
In Dickinson v. Grand Junction Canal Co., Parke B says
on this point, "if the course of a subterranean stream
were well known---as in the case with many, which sink under-
ground pursue for a short space a subterranean course, and
then emerge again---it never could be contended that the
owner of the soil, unde', which the stream flowed, could not
maintain an action for the diversion of it, if it took place
under such circumstances as would have enabled him to recover
if the stream had been wholly above ground." So also in
the case of Delhi v. Youmans before referred to, Judge
Boardman says: "Subterranean streams that have a known and
well defined channel, constituting a regular and constant
flow of water, are subject to the same law with surface t:::
streams and subject only to like interruptions and inter-
ference."
Thus far we have considered the application of the prin-
ciple that a person is liable only for such damage as ought
reasonably to be foreseen as a result of his acts. This
from the very nature of the rights with which we have been
dealing covers a majority of the decisions on the subject.
Some of the cases raised the question as to whether rights
17
in percolating waters might be gained by prescription, but
so
it has been uniformly held that no rights could bb 'acquired.
This is undoubtedly correct, as prescription is based on a
supposed grant made at some remote period, and in these
cases it would be absurd to presume a grant of rights of
whose existence the supposed grantor had no knowledge. A
great many of the cases also contain dicta to the eflect
that defendant would have been liable if he had acted with
malice. This however comes more properly under a discussion
of those cases where the resulting injury could be foreseen,
which will next be considered.
From the foregoing discussion we find that a person is
not liable for interfering with the flow of subterranean
waters in a majority of cases. The true basis of this non-
liability is that the damage is unexpected, and not that the
owner of the soil has an absolute rigt.t of property in perco-
lating waters. If we recognized this latter basis as the
true one, there would be no use of taking up cas 3s, where a
person can see that he will injure his neighbor by using his
own water, for it is a general rule of property that a man
can use his own as he may see fit although his neighbor may
suffer inconvenience because such property is not given to
him. But let us assume that in a given case such water is
not the absolute property of the defendant, the owner of the
soil, and also let us assume, that the natural and probable
result to be expected from defendant's acts is a damage to
plaintiff, then according to the second principle of torts
laid down at the commncement of this article, defendant
should be held liable unless he can show that the law gives
him a privilege knowingly to inflict such damage. The right
to sucha privilege as before stated is one of policy de-
pending upon the results to be attained; that is, the Court's
aim to adopt some principle controlling the question of
19
privilege which they think most conducive to the general
public welfare. An instance is seen in the doctrine of
flowing surface streams. Here a riparian owner can foresee
the damage that a stoppage or corruption of the flow will
cause, but still the Courts say he is not liable for any
damage caused by a reasonable use of the water, even though
by such use his neighbors use is destroyed. What is a
reasonable use is a question of fact depending largely upon
the circu'stances of each particular case. Thus it has been
held, that it is a reasonable use if a party taked all the
water flowing in a stream if he requires it for ordinary
domestic purposes, this being called an ordinary use. In
larger streams, a reparian owner has also the right to use
the water for other than domestic purposes, but this extra-
ordinary use is inferior to the ordinary use of other ri-
parian owners, and the extraordinary use of one proprietor
is no greater than that of others simply from his advantage
in position on the stream. In sane states with dry climates
it has also been held, a reasonable use to take all of a
surface stream for purposes of irr4gation. The doctrine of
reasonable use I think can also be applied to cases involving
damages caused by the interruption or pollution of subterra-
nean waters where such damage can be foreseen.
A leading case on this phase is Chas qorev . v. Richards,
7 H.L.C. 379. Plaintiffs were the owners of an ancient mill
situated on the banks of the Wandle river and for a period of
upwards of half a century the owners of this mill had been
entitled to use and enjoy the flow of said river for the
purpose of working and using this mill. The river Wandle
had its source near the town of Craydon and was fed and
supplied by rain falling on the surrounding territory and
finding its way by percolation through the soil to the river.
Defendants sunk a well on their own land near the town of
Craydon and about one fourth of a mile from the riverfor
the purpose of supplying the town of Craydon with water.
It was found as a fact in the case, that the natural effect
to be reasonably expected from sinking the well and continu-
ally pumping large quantities of water for a long time,
would be to sensibly diminish the water supply in the river
Wandle. Nevertheless after sinking the well, defendants
pumped dailytherefrom about 500,000 gallons of water, where-
by the flow in the river was perceptibly diminished and the
plaintiffs greatly damaged, for which they brought action.
Applying the doctrine of reasonable use and we have practical-
ly the same problem to solve as though defendants had taken
precisely the same amourtof water from the river. The re-
sults would be just the same in both cases and we have
assumed that such results ought reasonably to have been fore-
seen. It is plain that such is not a reasonable use, and
the learned judges intimate that if the water had been
taken from the river directly, defendants must have been
held liable. However I fail to see why they should be al-
lowed to do indirectly what could not have been done directly
when the damages to be expected are obviously the same in
either case. Yet this was allowed by the learned judges in
this case, when they held that defendants were not liable.
It seems to me that it is just here,, that the application
of the doctrine laid down in Acton v. Blundell works harm.
The judges in this case quote from Acton v. Blundell with
approval overlooking the fact that the decisive point in that
case is entirely wanting here. The cases of Rawston v.
'Taylor, 11 Exch. 3M. and Broadbent v. Ramsbotham 11 Exch.
602 are also both relied upon to sustain the decision in
this case. In these cases defendants drained marshy places
on their land in order to make it tillable. In consequence
of this drainage, the flow of natural streams of water was
diminished and plaintiffs injured thereby. Defendants were
not held liable in either case and the judges cite them as
sustaining the proposition that waters on the land, not part
of a flowing stream are the absolute property of the owner
of the land and, that consequently he is not liable for pre-
venting their flow to a natural stream. These cases there-
fore appear to have a direct bearing on the point. We
cannot however predicate so much on them as this, for they
go no farther than to actually decide that defendants were
mneliable for a reasonable use of their land and that
draining it to render it tillable is a reasonable use.
Therefore, they cannot be cited as giving defendant an abso-
lute right to intercept water that would reach a natural
stream, but are of importance only as they bear upon what
is a reasonable use.
Some of the learned judges seem to think also that a
decision for the plaintiff involved the establishing of the
doctrine, that a person would be liable in any case if he
interfered with water that naturally would find its way to a
water course. Such a doctrine, they argued, would prevent
the clearing of land, as forests preserve the streams;
would prevent draining land or it might prevent in man- cases
building on the land, structures whose roofs would prevent
the rain from falling in itsnatural manner and percolating
the same stream. Such arguments can have but little force
if looked at properly as it is obvious that a decision for
plaintiff would not mean that in no case could percolating
waters be interfered with and further, it is clear that
every instance referred to was of the plainest sort of rea-
sonable use. It was also argued that as each land owner
had a right to a well for his ovm use, plaintiffs could be
injured to the same extent and no one be liable, since it
could not perhaps be said that the first well had done any
appreciable injury and the owner of the last well should not
be liable for the damage done by all, simply because his
happened to make the loss appreciable. Why then ought
defendants to be liable for digging one well to supply
a thousand people and no one be liable for the digging of a
thousand wells. The fallacy of this argument lies in
assuzning that the water from the one well went only to supply
land owners who might have dug wells. If it went only to
such as had rights to dig wells, it would have undoubtedly
been a reasonable use and defendants not liable. Lord
WenzlQrdale although concurring with the other judges does so
with reluctance and his opinion is much in the nature of a
dissentigZ opinion. It seems to me that the following quo-
tation from his &pinion expresses the true conclusion to be
drawn from the facts: "The question in this case, therfore,
as it seems to me resolves itself into an injury, whether
the defendant exercised his right of employing the subter-
raneous waters in a reasonable manner. Had he made the
well and used the steam engines for the supply of water for
the use of his own property, and those living on it, there
could have been no question. If the number of houses upon
it had increased to any extent and the quantity of water
for the families dwelling on the property had been 0ropor-
tionately augmented, there could have been no just grounds of
complaint. But I doubt very greatly the legality of the
defendant's acts in abstracting water for the use of a large
district in the neighborhood, unconnected with his own es-
tate, for the use of those who would have no right to take
p
it directly themselves, and to the injury of those neighbor-
ing proprietors who have an equal right with themselves.
It does not follow that each person who was supplied with
water by the defendant could have dug a well for himself on
his own land, and taken the like quantity of water, so that
the defendant may have taken much more than would have been
abstracted if each had exercised his own right. The same
objection would not apply to the abstraction of water for
the use of the dwellers on defendant's land, even though they
carried on trades requiring more water than would be used
for mere domestic purposes; it would still be for their
purposes only. But in this case there has been An abstrac-
tion of water for purposes whojly unconnected with the en-
joyment of the defendanit's land."
Another case very much like that of Chasemore v.
Richards is that of Dickinson v. The Canal Co., 7 Exch. 282.
Defendant Company in constructing their canal cut off water
that would have found its way to flowing streams. Plaintiffs
were mill owners on one of such streams and were allowed to
recover damages for their injury by the Court of Exchecquer
Pollock C. B. writing the opinion. This was an earlier case
though than Chasemore v. Richards and seems to be questioned
by it, Justice Wightman in his opinion seaning to think the
Dickinson case inconsistent with the principles established
by Acton v. Blundell.
Another case illustrating this phase of the question is
that of Burroughs v. Sattcrlee 67 Iowa 396. The plaintiff
here was the owner of certain land which he leased to the
defendant for mining purposes. While borin, for coal a
vein of' water possessing magnetic 14perties and of great
value for medicinal purposes was struck. Defendant:;oonvcyed
all his interest in the well and land to plaintiff who erect-
ed lexpensive buildings and advertised the healing qualities
of the water. Many persons were thereby attracted to this
watering place for treatment and pleasure and the premises
became a source of much profit -to plaintiff. Later defen-
dant purchased land adjoining plaintiff's and drilled another
well about 200 feet distant with the expectation of strik-
ing the same vein.of water. He did strike the same vein
and as his land was lower than that of plaintiff, the water
in plaintiff's well ceased to flow as formerly, all flowing
from defendant's well. For a time after drilling this well
defendant placed a piece of pipe on the top of his well and
raised the discharge pipe to the same height as the discharge
pipe in plaintiff's well, when the water flowed from both
thus furnishing an ample supply for both parties. Later
defendant removed this pipe and plaintiff asked for an in-
junction compelling him to replace it. The trial Court
granted the injunction, and the higher Court sustained them,
the judge saying in the opinion: "We think the Court very
properly held that these parties should each use the water
from his ovn well so as not to injury the other, upon the
same principle that the owner of land over which a stream
of water has its course may have a reasonable and proper use
of the water as it flows, but may not wholly divert it from
the adjoining propriet.or."
Hale v. McLea, 53 Cal. 578 Is another illustrative
case. Here plaintiff and defendant were owners of adjoin-
ing ranches. On plair~iff's land and near the line between
the two ranches was a spring which supplied water for plain-
tiff's cattle. From this spring a line of bushes extended
across the division line and upon defendant's land. Such
bushes in that region were usually found only over water
courmes, but there was no surface stream there and the bushes
formed the only indication of a subterranean flow. Defendant
dug a trendh on his land at right angles with the line of
bushes, and thus cut off the s,,pply to plaintiff's spring.
The trench was dug for the purpose of cutting off this sub-
terranean stream, the defendant using part of the water for
watering his stock. Plaintiff prayed for an injunction
and his prayer was granted, on the ground, that had the
stream been a surface stream defendant would not under the
circumstances have been entitled to divert more than was ne-
cessary for his use and the facts sho 'red that he allowed same,.
to go to waste. Other cases might be cited along this same
line, but these will be sufficient to show that the doctrine
of reasonable use applies or should apply the same to the
diversion of known subterranean waters as to the diversion of
surface waters. The application of' this same principle
would also prevent the dive-r'sion of water from a natural
stream, after it had become a pa-t of such stream. City
Authooities would therefore have no more right to take
water from a flowing stream by drilling a well on the banks
of the stream and piznping large quantities of water there-
from, than they would to take the water directly from the
stream itself, without first allowing it to percolate into
the well. Two very good cases on this point are: ActAna
Mills v. Brookline 127 Mass. 69, Emporia v. Soden 25 Kansas
588.
With regard to the pollution of subte-ranean waters, as
strict a "ule applies as is applicable in the case of surface
streams, and this seems to be so even in jurisdictions where
in all other instances it is held that surface and subterra-
nean waters are governed by different principles. The re-
mark of the learned judge,. in the old case of Tenant v.
Goldwin 2 Ld Raymond 1089, that "he whose dirt it is must
keep It that it may not trespass", seems to have exercised
a Very potent influence in decisions of this class of cases.
That was a case where filth fom defendant's privy oozed
through into plaintiff's cellar adjoining and defendant is
held for danages. A strict. application of the foregoing
principleowould render a person liable in all cases for
polluting the waters of another. But in a -ecent case in
Michigan, Judge Cooley very pointedl" observes: "If withdraw-
ing the water from one's well by an excavation on adjoin-
ing lands will give no right of action, it is difficult to
understand how corrupting its waters by a proper use of the
adjoining premises can be actionable when there is no actual
intent to injure and no negligence. The one act destroys
the well, and the other does no more." This perhaps is
stating the doctrine as to non-liability for polluting the
waters too strongly. A person would not be j ustified in
polluting a well and thins spoiling it simplv because he
might dig one for the use of his own premises which would
cause the other to dry up. Digging the well might be a
reasonable use of his premises, whereas the depositing of
filth which would filter into the ground and pollute subter-
ranean waters would not. In fact, pollution of waters
usually results from a non-natural use of the land and in
most cases could be avoided by ordinary care, and hence in a
majority of cases the plaintiff recover's because the defen-
dant cannot establish that the law grants him the pivilege
to inflict such an injury. The true doctrine here As in
surface streams ij does the pollution result from a reason-
able use by defendant of his premises!
A good case Illustrazing what is a reasonable use of
lands :hat ma'" callse floing water to be polluted Is that of
Pennsylvanla Coal Co. v. Sanderson 113 Pa. St. 126.
This case was before the Supreme Con-t of Pennsylvania four
times, the last decision overruling the first and holding
that the trial court erred in charging as directed by the
Supreme Court in their first decision. Defendants were
mine o,,vners and in working their mines pumped mine water
upon the land, from whence it naturally found its way into a
small mo'lntain brook, of pure running water. Plaintiff was
the ovmer of land through which this brook ran and used the
water from it for domestic and ornamental purposes and had a
large trout pond supplied by it, having made his improve-
ments before defendantsopenedtheir mine. The water from
the mine fouled this brook so as to render the water unfit
for use, killing the fish in the pond, spoiling the pipes
in plaintiffs' house, etc. It was held that plaintiff could
not recover, as the injury resulted from a reasonable use
by defendants of their land and the injury could not have
been avoided by exercising reasonable care. In deciding
this case, the Court say, that if defendants were liable to
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plaintiff they would be liable to all -.iparian ovmers and
would
to hold them liable to all in many cases be equivalent to
ordering the mines closed as the profits from the coal would
not pay the damages to rparian oners. They were therefore
called upon to decide which of two conflicting interests
they would recognize, the coal mining industry or the rights
of riparian owners to have flowing waters left unpolluted
for domestic uses~ fish ponds, etc. The judges thought
that coal mining was the most important as bringing the
greatest benefits to a majotity of the eitizens of the State,
as there were other sources for water than streams and if
not it was more practicabl- for riparian owners to filter
what little water they needed for domestic purposes than for
coal companies to filter the immense quantities taken from
their mines* th-is I think was a correct conclusion and il-
lustrates also how the Courts will weigh results in deciding
the question of privelege.
A very important case showing under what circumstances
a person will be held responsible for damages caused by
polluting subterranean waters in Collins v. Charties Gas
Co. 131 Pa. St. 143. Plaintiff was the owner of a house
and lot in the Town of Glenfie]d. Upon his lot was a well
to suwply water for domestic purposes. Defendant Company
drilled gas wells in that vicinity for the purpose of ob-
taining natural gas. In drilling these wells, a vein of
salt water rose in the wells and mingled vithh2,water in the
stratum that supplied plaintiff's welljthus rendering it
unfit for use. The facts show that such a result was na-
turally to be expected fom drilling the gas wells without
shutting off the salt water from the fresh water, which
might have been done had reasonable care and judgment been
exercised. In this case the learned judge it seems to me
gives us the esseipe of the law controlling subterranean
waters in the following quotation from his opinion: "It is
therefore clear, from the principles and reasonings of all
the cases that the distinction between rights An surface
and in subterranean waters is not founded on the fact of
their location above or below ground, but on the fact of
knowledge actual or reasonably acquirable of their existence,
location and couqse. The principle of Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Sanderson is precisely the same as that of Wheatley v.
Baugh (a case almost identical with Acton v. Blundell) and
is of general application. It is that the use which in-
flicts the damage must be natural, proper, and free from , -
negligence and the damage unavoidable. On the question of
negligence the question of knowledge is always important and
may be conclusive. Hence the practical injury is, first,
whether the damage was necessary and unavoidable; secondly,
if not was it sufficiently obvious to have been foreseen
and also preventable by reasonable ca"e and expenditure?
In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson the damage was unavoid-
able. In Wheatley v. Baugh it was not Iscertainable
before hand; hence the plaintiff had no cause of action in
either case." He then goes on to state that if the bounda-
ries of knowledge have so extended that the reason of the
law has ceased to be, why the law also founded on such rea-
son ought to fall. Hence in the case at bar as progress
in geology had given knowledge of the existence of the various
strata of water, and as the means of preventing the mixing
were available at a reasonable expense, he decided that it
would be a violation of the living spirit of the law not to
recognize the change, and apply the settled and immutable
principles to the altered conditions of fact.
Many of the cases on subterranean waters contain state-
ments, mostly data, to the effect that defendant would have
been liable had he acted with malice. Malice as here used
may be defined as the doing of an tnjury intentionally with-
out cause or excuse, the willful infliction of an i4ly.
It is very closely allied to gross negligence. Thus if a
person does some act likely to result in injury to another
which might have been avoided by a proper amunt of caution
we say he is guilty of negligence. If the liability of in-
jury is obvious we say the act.t was.negligenc- f the injury
is almost inevitable and actually follows the doing of the
act then we say the act was malicious. The close relation
between gross negligence and malice is also shown from the
fact that pui1-iVe damages are allowed by many courts in
cases where the injury inflicted has been malierious or was
the result of gross negligence on the part of the defendant.
Looked at in this light, cases where the defendant acted
with malice, would naturally come under that principle where
the damage could be foreseen. For when we say that the
defendant has acted with malice we assume that he intended
to inflict the injury, and intending to inflict the injury
ke must naturally infer that he would adopt means that he
foresaw or thought would accomplish his end, that is, he must
be held to have acted with knowledge as to what the consequen-
ces of his acts were apt to be. Having proceeded thus far
we must accordingly hold defendant liable in such a case
unless he can justify his act as a reasonable use of his
land. Here again however our definition helps us out as
35
it says malice is the intentional infliction of an injury
without cause or excuse. Hence it would appear clear that
in applying our principles we must hold defendant liable
in all cases where he has maliciously interfered with sub-
terranean waters.
The only cases directly bearing on this point however
take an opposite view and hold that defendant is not liable
for maliciously interfering with the flow of subterranean
waters. Such decisions are the logical outcome of the
doctrine that water flowing beneath the soil is as much
the property of the owner of the soil as rocks or minerals
there found. If the water belonged absolutely to the owner
of the soil the same as the soil itself it would be difficult
to see where any liabilitypould attach for his doing an act
which only prevented his own property from escaping from his
premises. It would be just as reasonable to say that be-
cause he did not care to make use of the minerals on his land
that he could not therefore prevent his neighbors from taking
them, as to say that because he did not wish to use the water,
which was his the same as the minerals, he could not there-
fore prevent others from taking it. The two leading cases
on this point are Chatfield v. Wilson 28 Vt. 49 and
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Phelps v. Nowlen 72 N. Y., 39. In the former defendant
dug a treleh in his own land and filled it with dry hard
earth to prevent water from filtering through into plaintiff's
to supply his spring. The judge said: "Putting this case,
then upon the ground that the water in question, while in
the earth of defendant is not distinct from it in the eye
of the law it becomes an important inquiry whether the act of
*he defendant in the obstruction of the underground water
upon his own premises, can be made actionable simply on the
ground that the motive was bad that induced it. The act,
being in itself lawful, could not subject the defendant to
damagesdunless by reason thereof,- some right of the plaintiff
had been violated." So in the New York case the judge
quotes with approval the following from Washburn: "But 1f
one has a legal right "to do certain acts in regard to his
own property it is difficult to imagine how he should forfeit
them from unfriendly motives toward the party who is affected
by them." There have been no cases as I have found which
squarely decided that defendant would be liable for malicious
interference with the flow of sub-surface waters* The
Vermont case however recognized that malicious motives would
make a difference if the same rule applied as apblied to sur-
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face streams, and I think there is no doubt but what all
ccurts now that recognize the doctrine of correlative rights
in subterranean waters would hold defendant liable for ma-
licious interference. Such being the case we will not go
into the mnerits of the discussion as to whether an act law-
ful in itself can make the doer liable if done fuom ma-
licious motives.
This is the condition then in which we find the law of
subterranean waters. The courts in the beginning fell un-
coneaiously into an error from which they have not entirely
freed themselves as yet. The tendency however of the later
decisions are in the right direction. There are many im-
portant cases which although I have examined them, have not
been referrcd to in the body of this article but a list of
such cases will be found at the end. The conclusions to be
drawn from these cases seem to me to be as follows:
I. The absolute dominion of the ovmer of the soil can-
not be so limited as to render him liable for the interference
substances
with rights which his neighbor has in passing under the sur-
face of his land, the existence of which rights was first
made known by the very act which would constitute the sub-
ject matter of complaint. This applies to diverting and
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corrupting waters. The case of Acton v. Blundell would
illustrate when a person was not liable for diverting waters.
In the case of Collins v. Gas Co. we would have an illus-
tration of the non-liability of defendants for corrupting
plaintiff's well, if they had not known of the existence
of the two veins of water and the drilling of their well
had first made known the fact that the salt water was apt to
rise and mix with the fresh water.
II. The absolute dominion of the owner of the soil will
not however give him the right to interfere with waters run-
ning under his land to that of his neighbor if he ought
reasonably to infer the existence of such subterranean waters,
and might by a reasonable use of his land avoid injury.
Diverting more than is necessary for the use of his premises
is not a reasonable use, the same as in surface streams.
Damage caused by negligence is not reasonable, nor is a ma-
licious injury reasonable. Necessary and unavoidable injury
may be justified as a reasonable use. If damages which in
the first instance could not have been foreseen can by the
use of reasonable care, expense, and consistently with a
reasonable use of the premises, be prevented from becoming
permanent, this principle also applies anda parttr would be
held for all unnecessary damages which might have been pre-
vented.
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Gas is another valuable substance found in many places,
permeating the porous rocks deep in the bowels of the earth
and rushing to the surface through any opening into the
basin in which it is held. Whatareitherights of adjoining
owners in relation to it? The leading case on this is
Hague v. Wheeler 27 At. 714. Plaintiffs and defendants
were owners of gas wells on adjoining lands. Defendant's
well was drilled at the instigation of one of the plaintiffs
and so no malice could be imputed in drilling it. Plaintiffs
were selling their gas but defendants were allowing the gas
from their well to escape into the air and waste. Plain-
tiffs asked an injunction restraining defendants from allow-
ing their gas to waste as it would sooner exhaust the supply
for plaintiffs' wells. They conceded that if defendants
were selling their gas they would have no right to the in-
junction but contend that defendants have no right to waste
it for the sole purposeof injuring them. The lower court
granted the injunction on the ground that the parties had
correlative rights in t1e gas the same as in water and that a
malicious use was not a reasonable use. The Court concede
that any use but one pUiely MaAlitoUs would be justifiable.
It says: "I concede that the defendants may lawfully take
as much gas s they can get by wells drilled upon their land,
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and apply it to any useful purpose though with an avowed
intention of destroying the plaintiffs' wells in so doing,
and a malicious pleasure in the act." The Supreme Court
reversed this decision on the ground that as the defaidants
had no malicious motive in drilling their well, they obtained
an absolute right of property in the gas that cane from it
the same as in coal taken from a mine and could do with it as
they saw fit. That because they could not make use of their
gas they were no more legally bound to give it to their
neighbors than they were to give them other property for
which they had no use and which might benefit such neighbors.
The decision then seems to all depend upon the fact whether
we are to treat surface owners as having a qualified property
in gas as in flowing waters or as having an absolute property
therein the same as in ores and minerals. The application
of our second principle in torts do not help us much as -re
have the courts divided as to whether the defendant is priv-
ileged to inflict injury under such circumnstances. The
lower Court says, that taking the gas though done maliciously
is a sufficient justification to grant tlie privilege if the
gas is applied to some useful purpose, but not otherwise,
the higher Court, that the right to take the gas at all is
sufficient justification for the injury no matter what the
motive for taking it or the use to which it is rut.
Coming back to the question as to the nature of the
property adjoining owners have in the underlying gas. Is
it a qualified and correlative iight of property like that
in flowing waters or is it more in the nature of ones prop-
erty in minerals? That gas differs from flowing water to a
great extent is obvious. One of the grounds for holding
that adjoining owners have ordy a qualified right in flowing
waters is that nature keeps the supply constant and this
not for the benefit of one particular owner but for all.
A use of all the water in a stream to-day will not interfere
with its flow to-morrow in the same place. Water that
flows by in the future may be the same that has already
flowed in the same course in the past. Not so with gas,
when once used it is gone forever, like minerals taken from
the earth, it never naturally finds 6ts way back. If a
land owrer does not take his share of the gas while it is
going he wont get any; nature has no process by which the
supply is kept continuous as is the water supply. Again
the reasonable use of water by adjoining owners gives each
only what is necessary for his own premises, neither can by
selling the water deprive the other. With the gas the
Court admitted that no liability would be created if defend-
ants were selling their gas no matter how much injury the
plaintiffs sustained. It may be true that no land ovmer
gets through his well gas exclusively from his own land,
but this alone is not sufficient to make out that his right
in such escaping gas is only a qualified right. Gas has
been teimeid a mineral ferae naturae and it seems to me that
drilling the well that hits the pocket containing the gas,
may be likened to firing the shot that kills the deer, the
man who strikes the gas being entitled absolutely to all
that he gets as the result of his strike the same as the
man who fires the shot which kills the deer is absolutely
entitled to it and to do as he pleases with the carcass.
Of course the exclusive right to drill belongs in the first
place to the land owners, but they may grant such right to
whoever they see fit. Taking this view and the result is
practically that all land owners overlying a pocket of gas
have rights of property in ga pon in it and owing to the im-
possibility of getting at the share that canes from the land
of each the best division possible to give each person the
absolute right to all that comes through all the wells he
may drill on his territory the same as he has an absolute
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right to all the game he kills on his own land. I wont go
into the question as to whether a person who has an absolute
right to do a certain thing is liable for damages if he
act solely from malice. A majority of the cases hold not,
but still there is much reason the other way. In Pennsyl-
vania they hold that no liability attaches for simple malice
so the Supreme Court were undoubtedly right in their deci-
sion. for that state.
A question similar to that involved in caso-sof perco-
lating waters arises with regard to damages caused by the
discharge of electricity into the earth. There are not many
cases on this point yet reported, but it must be remembered
that the remarkable developments in electrical science have
been nade but recently, and the damaging effects of electri-
city along certain lines is just beginning to be felt. E-
lectricity from electric railways has thus far caused the
greater part of damage. Scattering through the earth it
is conducted by means of the ground connections to the tele-
phone wires and being stronger than the telephone current
overcomes it and in many cases has rendered telephone lines
practically useless. Besides this the electricity has also
acted Uponoas and water pipes and by a system of electrolysis
has practically destroyed the gas and water mains along the
lines of these roads in manv large cities. The only cases
at present reported are in relation to injuries caused to
telephone lines by electricity escaping from street railways.
They are two in number, me arising in this country and one
in England, and although nearly identical in fact the de-
cisions,xre in direct conflict. The English Court applies
the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher 3 H. L. 330, which is
that, "if the owner of land brings upon his land anything
not naturally upon it, and which is in itself dangerous,
and may become mischievous if not kept under proper control,
though in so doing he may act without personal wilfulness
or negligence, he will be liable in damages for any mischief
thereby occasioned." In these cases though the land into
which both plaintiff andde-fendanits discharged their electric
current did not belong to them they stood in practically
the same relationto each other as that sustained by ad-
joining owners, as each',tad the legal right to the use of
the land for his particular purpose. Hence the doctrine
of Rylands v. Fletcher-could apply here the same as in a
case between neighboring owners, and applying this doctrine
defeniants would be held liable.
Nat. Telephone Co. v. Baker, L.R. 2Ch. Div.1893.
The American case however does not apply the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher, which in fact it says is not generally
accepted. This is the case of Cumberland Tel. Co. v. United
Electric Ry. Co. 42 Fed. 273 and the facts are as already
stated. In his opinion the judge says: "In solving these
questions, we are compelled to bear in mind the fact that
the science of electricity is still in its experimental stage;
that a device which to-day may be the best, cheapest, and
most practicable, may in another year, be superseded in com-
parably better fitted for the purpose. It is quite possi-
ble too that the legal obligations of the parties may change
With the progress of invention, and the duty of sunnounting
the difficulty be thrown upon our party or the other as a
cheaper or more effectual remedy is discovered." The learn-
ed judge then discusses the principles involved and comes,
to the following conclusion: "That where a person is making
a lawful use of his own property, or of a public franchise, in
such a manner as to occasion injury to another, the question
of his liability will depend upon the fact whether he has
made use of the means which in the progress of science and
improvement has been found best. If in the case LLnder con-
sideration, it were shown that the double trolley would
obviate the injury to the plaintiff without exposing defendant
or the public to any great inconvenience or a large ex-
penze we think it would be their duty to make use of it.
and should have no doubt of our power to aid the complainant
byan-injunction; ,but as the proofs ' show that a more
effectual and 1ewe objectionable and expensive remedy is
open to the complainant, we think the obligation is upon
the telephone company to adopt it, and that the damages in-
cidentally -done to complainant arenot chargeable to defend-
ants. Unless we are to hold that the telephone company
has a monopoly of the use of the earth, for its feeble cur-
rent, not only as against defendants but as against all forms
of electrical energy which, in a progress of science may,
hereafter require its use we do not see how this atiom.can' be
maintained."
This I tiAnk is :,Mre logical and just than the English
rule and telephone companies to prevent interference with
their lines by electric roads have adopted the metallic cur-
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rent.:> tFrom what has been quoted from the opinion we
can also see that the learned judge has applied the pinciples
of torts referred to at the beginning. Defendants liability
when it attaches is made to defend upon the fact that he
could foresee the injury to Plaintiff and could by the use
of reasonable care and expense have avoided. The same rtle
I think also applies to damages done by electricity to gas
and water pipes. In the fir'st instance the electric rail-
ways A not being able to foresee such damage, perhaps should
not be held liable. If however after acquiring knowledge
of the effects of electricity escaBping to the earth they do
not take all precautionary measures possible to prevent
injury they should thereafter be held for any damages.
Progress 4n science and invention therefore must play a
great part in determining just what liability will attach
in any particular case as it may arise.
What the future may bring forth in litigation over sub-
terranean rights is difficult to predict, and is perhaps of
no great consequence at present. But with electric rail-
w7ays rapidly increasing in number, with the growth of u c
in large cities in favor of. compelling telephone, telegraph,
and electric light companies to bury their wires, and with
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subterranean rapid transit almost assured, it is not im-
probable that subterranean rights may be a very fruitful
source of litigation.
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